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Abstract
It has been known for many years that security
failures are caused at least as often by bad incentives
as by bad design. However, the regulatory correction
of bad incentives is not easy in practice and it is still
lacking. In the meantime, system dynamics models of
security systems can improve the situation by
increasing the awareness that misaligned incentives
can backfire as long-term consequences of security
failures hit back the principal. We illustrate our
argument using system archetypes and concept
simulation models revealing the impact of two different
security strategies, viz. misaligned incentives (the
customer having the burden of proof in case of alleged
fraud) vs the bank having the burden of proof. From
this we argue that online system dynamics could be
used in eGovernment to educate principals and the
public. Also, legal measures could become more
effective when supported with forensic evidence from
simulation models.

1. Introduction
An influential article on the economics of
information security states that “security failures is
caused at least as often by bad incentives as by bad
design” [1, p. 610].
A conspicuous example of misaligned incentives
causing bad security originates when the organization
that is most responsible (or in a privileged position) for
providing system security does not bear the full costs
of its failure [1, p. 601ff, 2, p. 105ff]. Such bad practice
contradicts the well-known insight from legal theory
that liability should rest on the party that can best
manage the risk.
Other examples of bad security resulting from
perverse incentives involve subtle relations between
the parties in the security “battlefield” [1, p. 161-169],
such as:
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1) Software vulnerabilities, that is, bugs in the
software that can be exploited by attackers, are
numerous and common. Why? Sloppy coding and
insufficient testing could be avoided – but it costs and
delays the release of the software.
2) Users are typically quite ignorant about the
subtleties of information security whereas software
developers and vendors of software know much better
about the quality of their products. In such a situation
of asymmetric information, software developers prefer
to rush to the market – so as to lock customers in – by
releasing products lacking sufficient security features
that the customer anyhow does not request.
3) Also, since software of high quality with
respect to security would cost significantly more than
software of poor quality security-ignorant users would
not pay more for features that they lack appreciation
for. Hence, the market is flooded with cheap software
lacking appropriate security. In a seminal paper,
Akerlof showed that when buyers have less
information – and thus less knowledge – about the
quality of products as sellers do, both quality and price
suffers [3].

2. Proposed measures
Based on the above lessons learned, non-technical
and primarily legal measures are proposed in [2]:
1) Ex ante regulation instead of ex post liability
– this kind of action should make involved entities
aware in advance that negative consequences may call
the involved entities for their liability. In case of
software vendors, these would have to provide
evidence with the product that it has been subjected to
adequate (security testing including) development
cycle.
2) Information disclosure – this measure would
stimulate involved entities to act accordingly. In case
of software producers, shedding the light on a case
would “disinfect” it. Further, the community has a
right to know, which would be an additional feedback
loop to prevent unwanted situations. One such
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requirement would be a mandated regular disclosure of
aggregated loss figures related to on-line banking and
payment cards. Similarly, control systems incidents
and intrusions should be disclosed as well.
3) Cyber insurance – such a market would be a
basis for providing incentives of involved entities to
take appropriate precautions through better and
consistent data statistics, risk-adjustments premiums,
and so on.
4) Indirect intermediary liability – there are
reasons that third parties may be held liable for the
actions of the involved parties. One such successful
example is the case with payment cards frauds in the
US. But there also exists an interesting variant of such
liability in case of Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) – if there is a copyright infringement, an
internet service provider (IS) is not automatically
liable. It becomes liable only, if upon notification, it
does not remove or block the distribution of
copyrighted material. A similar principle could be
adopted for ISPs liability in case of malware infection
– upon notification they should assist their customers
in malware removal.
5) Accreditation requirements for software
engineers. Software now rests at the core of all critical
infrastructures, while on the other hand almost anyone
can actually be a programmer. This is by far not the
case in, e.g., medicine, jurisprudence, mechanical
engineering, etc.
In a complex global world it will take a long time
until effective measures of legal nature have been
deployed and work as intended. Is it possible to assist
this process in the meantime, say, by education?
Following we show that a system dynamics model
of an archetypal example of misaligned incentives
explains the impacts of two different security
strategies, viz. one with misaligned incentives (the
bank customer having the burden of proof in case of
alleged fraud) and another with well-aligned incentives
(the bank having the burden of proof). The first
strategy led ultimately to major costs to the bank (the
principal) in terms of compensating the customers who
suffered from fraud and in delayed investments to
improve security at much higher cost than the second
strategy.
In the last section we conclude that online system
dynamics could be used in eGovernment to educate
principals and the public about the impacts of
misaligned incentives. We argue also that the future
legal measures could become more effective when
supported with forensic evidence from simulation
models.

3. Counter-intuitive impacts of misaligned
incentives
Misaligned incentives push the costs of security
failures on third parties, but this is not the whole truth.
Security systems are complex not only in the sense of
being composed of a high number of components (the
so-called combinatorial complexity). The most
challenging part of the security system complexity is
the dynamic complexity, induced by the propagation of
effects over time owing to the interdependencies
between the system components. Such propagation of
effects results in unexpected, counterintuitive dynamic
behavior. In particular, unintended side effects can act
as boomerangs that, with a time delay, hit back on the
owner of the security defenses who intends to push the
costs of bad security to third parties.
Accordingly, awareness of the dynamic complexity
of security systems can motivate the owner of security
defenses to proactively analyze the long-term costs of
boomerang effects from misaligned incentives versus
the perceived short-term gains by saving on security
and pushing the cost of failures on third parties.
Actually, once the long-term perspective enters into the
analysis the delayed effects of harming third parties
may be seen in a new light as additional boomerang
effects to be considered. It is not unreasonable to hope
that the rules of the game will tip over as security
providers increasingly adopt the stance of analyzing
security system solutions as complex dynamic systems.
Those providers who adopt the principle that liability
should rest on the party that can best manage the risk
will hopefully over time be rewarded in terms of
customer loyalty and expanding market share. A
process of insight and education is needed here.

4. Why system dynamics
In this paper we suggest using system dynamics to
assist mitigating the occurrence of bad incentives
causing bad information security.
System dynamics (SD) is an established discipline
that has a proven application track record in many
areas [4-6], including in information security. A core
asset of system dynamics modeling is its proven
capability to change the mental models of decision
makers based on insight on the cause effect relations
shaping intended and unintended consequences.
Interestingly, an area where system dynamics has
had a strong impact is modeling for litigation and
disputes in project management [7-9, 10, p. 170-171].
Hence, the question arises as to whether system
dynamics also could clarify causes and responsibilities
in terms of post mortem models of disputed cases
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regarding misaligned incentives in information
security. We suspend discussion of this question for the
time being, but we return to the issue in the final
section of this paper.
In the next two sections we proceed to analyze a
case of misaligned incentives so as to illustrate the
power of system dynamics to reveal unintended longterm effects and explain their counterintuitive impacts,
in other words to help educate the parties involved in
the security domain. In this respect we alert the reader
that the emphasis (to be shown below) on the
“feedback loops” of the models is of the utmost
importance. A key tenet of system dynamics is that the
interplay of the feedback loops shapes the behavior
over time of the system.
The reader who does not have background in
system dynamics should read the short introduction in
ref. [11], which also can be found online in the
homepage of the System Dynamics Society as the
entry “What is SD”.

For the record: After suffering from the bad
experience the European banks changed the rules so
that the burden of proof no longer was on the customer.

5.1. Qualitative model of ATM security
Consider first the European ATM case. A typical
bank acted by setting up the ATM system so that if the
customer disputed the transaction, the burden of proof
was on the customer. Thus, the bank’s intervention is
‘Burden of proof on customers’, see Figure 1.

5. Understanding the boomerang effects of
misaligned incentives
Since we want to introduce the logic of our
argument using system dynamics models it pays to
choose a case as simple as possible so that the models
are themselves simple enough. The simplest case that
comes to mind relates to security issues when banks in
Europe and the US introduced Automatic Telling
Machines (ATMs).
In a survey of fraud against Automatic Telling
Machines (ATMs) at the time of their introduction
[12], Anderson found that patterns of fraud depended
on whether the bank’s customer or the bank itself was
liable. In the USA, if a customer disputed a transaction,
the bank had the burden of proof that the customer was
mistaken or lying; this gave the banks a motive to
protect their systems properly. But in several European
countries (including Britain, Norway and the
Netherlands), the customer had the burden of proof: the
bank was right unless the customer could prove it
wrong – an almost impossible task. The “lucky” banks
in these countries became complacent and careless.
Eventually, epidemics of fraud demolished their
complacency. In contrast, the banks in the USA and
other countries having the burden of proof suffered
much less fraud. Most remarkably, they spent less
money on security than their European counterparts.
Thus, better aligned incentives, whereby the defender
suffered most if security was bad, turned out to be the
best investment for the banks and for the banks’
customers as well [1, p. 611, 12].

Figure 1 Qualitative model (archetype) for the European
ATM case
The intended outcome of the bank’s intervention
was to reduce the number of fraudulent transactions by
the customer (represented by the variable ‘Fraudulent
transactions’). The influence arrow from ‘Burden of
proof on customers’ to ‘Fraudulent transactions’ has a
minus sign – a negative polarity – expressing that the
two variables move in opposite direction. That is, if the
burden of proof on customers is increased, the outcome
– fraudulent transactions – gets reduced (and vice
versa).
The degree to which the intended outcome has been
achieved impacts back on the intervention with
positive polarity – the more/less fraudulent
transactions, the stronger/weaker the bank’s
intervention is applied. Thus, one has as intended
consequence a control strategy, expressed by the
balancing feedback loop labelled ‘B: Customer is
liable’.
The unintended consequence of the bank putting
the burden of proof on the customer is an increase in
the bank’s complacency [1, p. 611] – shown on Figure
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1 by the influence arrow from ‘Burden of proof in
customers’ to ‘Bank’s complacency’. Note that this
arrow has positive polarity, expressing that the
variables move in the same direction. That is, an
increase in the burden of proof exerted on customers
increases the bank’s complacency, whereas if the bank
exerted less pressure on making the customer liable,
the bank’s complacency would decrease.
In turn, the variable ‘Bank’s complacency’
influences ‘ATM security’ with negative polarity: an
increase in the bank’s carelessness decreases the ATM
security over time – with some time delay, indicated by
||, as too little is done to analyze the causes of fraud,
discover vulnerabilities and exploits, and remedy them.
Over time, again with some delay, ‘ATM security’
influences ‘Fraudulent transactions’ with negative
polarity – expressing that a decrease in ‘ATM security’
increases the rate of fraudulent transactions – as more
and more crooks discover the poor security in the
ATMs.
Note that the influence arrow from fraudulent
transactions to burden of proof on the customer closes
a second feedback loop. Walking along the influence
links and considering their polarities it can be
recognized that this feedback look is reinforcing (R):
if, e.g., the bank increases the burden of proof on
customers, the chain of influences along the feedback
loop ‘R: ATM fraud epidemic’, ultimately forces the
bank to a further increase of the burden of proof on the
customers. The bank’s intervention can be
characterized as ‘barking up the wrong tree’, since the
intervention is directed to the bank’s customers,
whereas most of the fraud arises from crooks that
exploit the neglected bad ATM security. The straight
line in the lower half of Figure 1 serves as reminder
that the unintended consequence is ‘hidden’ beyond a
mental boundary of the decision makers in the bank:
the unintended consequence is not seen until the
resulting ATM fraud epidemic forced a reconsideration
of the European bank’s strategy.
The causal loop displayed on Figure 1 is an out-ofcontrol problem archetype [13]. The balancing
feedback loop ‘B: Customer is liable’ expresses the
intended consequence of the bank’s its strategy, viz. to
control fraud. The unintended consequence is
expressed by the reinforcing feedback loop ‘R: ATM
fraud epidemic’. Reinforcing feedback loops can act
viciously or virtuously, depending on whether they are
triggered to increase or decrease unpleasant effects. In
this case, the reinforcing feedback loop is vicious
indeed. Owing to the banks’ refusal to recognize their
prominent part in the bad ATM security [12] –
expressed symbolically by the boundary line on Figure
1 – and the time delays in the chain of influences, the
crooks produced an avalanche of fraud that at long last

caused major customer dissatisfaction, loss of
reputation and ultimately forced the banks to improve
the neglected ATM security – at much higher costs
than a well-designed proactive security would have
required [1, 12].
Figure 2 adds to the problem archetype of Figure 1
a solution balancing feedback loop (labeled in Figure 2
with ‘B: Bank awakes at last’). The bank’s new
intervention consists in fixing the vulnerabilities in the
ATMs in relation to the occurring fraudulent
transactions so as to improve the ATM security – all
processes that consume considerable time, indicated by
the time-delayed influence arrows (marked ||).

Figure 2 Solution archetype for the European ATM case
Note that the line labeled ‘boundary’ is shown
stippled in Figure 2 – indicating that the mental barrier
hiding the unintended consequence from the sight of
the decision maker has become ‘transparent’ upon
reflection and understanding. An insightful decision
requires consideration of all the relevant aspects of the
problem.
In the US ATM case if the customer disputes a
ATM transaction the burden of the proof is on the
bank. Thus, the bank’s intervention is ‘Burden of proof
on bank’ on Figure 3. The intended consequence was
to reduce the number of fraudulent transactions
(represented by the variable ‘Fraudulent transactions’)
to some acceptable target. The bank assumed the
responsibility and spent resources on ATM security as
needed (expressed by ‘Security spending’) [1, 12],
which affected fraudulent transactions with negative
polarity. To the extent that fraudulent transactions
occurred, the burden of proof on the bank was exerted,
closing the loop. The intended consequence was
controlling, resulting in a balancing feedback loop,
labeled ‘B: Bank is liable’.
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security (feedback loop ‘B: The bank awakes at last’,
Figure 2). The security investments were very costly,
since the ATM system was not designed with security
in mind, and the solution was less good than if the
bank had made security a strong priority in the first
place [12].

Figure 3 Archetype for the US ATM case
Customers and non-customers know that it is
difficult and costly for the bank to prove who did the
fraudulent transaction. They know too that the bank
will not act if the fraudulent transactions involve small
sums of money. Hence, dishonest customers and
professional crooks speculated on that, and (with some
time delay) they came up with ingenious ‘Fraud
schemes’ (positive polarity), which increased the
number of ‘Fraudulent transactions’ (positive polarity).
The unintended outcome was a reinforcing loop (‘R:
Betting on the bank to accept the loss’). We may
assume that this unintended consequence was ‘hidden’
from the sight of the decision maker – expressed by the
straight line labeled ‘boundary’. If not completely
hidden, we may assume that the bank did not act
proactively to mitigate this kind of small fraud until it
became sufficiently numerous and costly.
Figure 4 expresses that the typical US bank
ultimately developed innovative solutions to stay ahead
of the crooks (as expressed by the new balancing
solution loop ‘B: Improving to beat the crooks’).
Also for the US case the causal loop on Figure 3 is
an out-of-control problem archetype, following the
terminology of Wolstenholme [13]. But the impact of
the out-of-control archetypes was quite different for
European and American banks.
In the European case the banks did not pay enough
attention to the ATM security. As the unintended
consequence showed up, with significant time delays
(Figure 1), the banks were increasingly facing bad
publicity and loss of customers, as well as getting
involved in costly court disputes. Sometimes the
customers won, making the banks losing face. In the
end, the banks had no choice but to acknowledge that
the original security solution was bad. They
compensated affected customers and had improve

Figure 4 Solution archetype for the US ATM case
In the US case, the banks designed the ATM
system with security in mind. Figure 3 shows that
ATM security is embedded in the intended outcome
feedback loop.
Although advances in fraud schemes forced the US
banks to enhance the ATM security, the fact that the
banks were security aware and that they were not
losing face facilitated a quick reaction and the remedy
was less costly than in the European case. This is in
accordance with the facts [1, 12].

5.2. Simulation model of ATM security
In the previous section §5.1 we used system
archetypes, which are qualitative models, to suggest
the causal structure, in terms of balancing and
reinforcing feedback loops, to explain the observations
about security spending and the fraud patterns when
ATMs where taken in use in Europe and the US.
However, the analysis of the feedback loops
composing the archetypes cannot claim more than to
provide plausible explanations. For more convincing
evidence it remains to show that a simulation model
expressing the feedback loops composing the
archetypes is able to render the observed behavior over
time for the fraud patterns – the ‘reference behavior’
for the ATMs in a typical European and a typical US
bank.
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Regrettably, the information available about the
ATM security case in Europe or the US is qualitative
and can be expressed in a few statements (p. 3)
describing patterns of behavior, rather than providing
numerical time series for the key variables of the
problem. Given such scarcity of numerical data a
‘concept’ system dynamics model is a natural choice.
Concept models have traditionally been used by
system dynamics practitioners to provide a platform for
further exploration of a problem. Concept models –
which are simplified and, thus, preliminary – serve as
stepping stones towards a more complete
understanding of the problem in question by providing
insights into the causal structure that could be
responsible for the observed over-time behavior [14].

<pressure to improve
ATM security>
<bank's delay to act
on pressure>
normal time for
vuln removal

At this stage, all that we require in terms of satisfying
the reference behavior is that the simulation reproduces
two key observations about patterns of behavior (p. 3):
1) that ATMs in some European countries were
exposed to an avalanche of fraud while the ATMs in
the US were much safer; 2) that the US banks invested
less in ATM security while their ATMs nevertheless
were more secure than their European counterparts.
We proceed to explain the main features of the
concept model of the ATM cases (European and US).
The reader interested in the complete details of the
models can find the Vensim files in the online
proceedings of ref. [15]. Use the free software Vensim
PLE for inspection of the model and for simulation.
Figure 5 shows features that are common in a system
dynamics models for the European and the US ATM
case.
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Figure 5 Core structure for a systems dynamics model of the ATM case showing common structures for the European
and the US bank
The core model shown on Figure 5 has three
structures representing following processes: 1)
lifecycle of ATM vulnerabilities; 2) fraud exploiting
ATM vulnerabilities; and 3) recruitment of fraudsters.
Lifecycle of ATM vulnerabilities: ATMs have
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to commit fraud.
Vulnerabilities exist in two states, represented by the

stocks ‘Vulnerabilities dormant’ and ‘Vulnerabilities
active’. Dormant vulnerabilities have not yet been
discovered and, hence, cannot be exploited. By chance
or clever schemes, vulnerabilities are discovered and
become ‘active – that is, exploitable. The flow
‘vulnerability activation’ in Figure 5 represents the
process rendering dormant to active vulnerabilities.
Active vulnerabilities are fixed soon after they show up
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(flow ‘vulnerability fixing’). A proactive posture
would in addition imply investment in discovery and
removal of as yet unknown dormant vulnerabilities to
prevent that they could be discovered and activated by
crooks (flow ‘vulnerability removal’ in Figure 5).
Fraud exploiting ATM vulnerabilities: Figure 5
shows two possible mechanisms for ATM frauds, viz
customer and non-customer (“crook”) fraud. The
model differentiates between frauds committed by
bank customers and crooks since the European bank
put the burden of proof on customers if they disputed
transactions allegedly committed by them. The
influence arrows from the stock ‘Vulnerabilities active’
to the flows ‘customer fraud rate’ and ‘crook fraud
rate’ express that the fraud rates depend on the extent
to which there are active vulnerabilities in the ATMs.
Recruitment of fraudsters: Crooks (non-customer
fraudsters) hear about the ATM vulnerabilities by
word-of-mouth. The structure with the stocks
“Potential non-customer fraudsters” and “Noncustomer fraudsters” represents the process of
recruitment of fraudsters according to a standard
process known as innovation diffusion [6, Ch. 9].
The variable “pressure to improve ATM security”
describes how the strategies of European and the US
banks (burden of proof on customers vs burden of
proof on bank) influenced vulnerability fixing and
<pressure to improve
ATM security>
<bank's delay to act
on pressure>
normal time for
vuln removal

removal. Accordingly, “pressure to improve ATM
security” is affected by different processes depending
on the strategy of the banks, as becomes apparent on
Figure 6-7.
The pressure to improve ATM security was
significantly higher for US banks – who had the burden
of proof with regards to fraud claims– than for
European banks, who made customers liable and to
being with didn’t suffer much when fraud was
committed.
Figure 6 shows the full system dynamics model for
the European ATM case. The core structure that was
displayed on Figure 5 is now connected by influence
arrows so as to create feedback loops that match the
loops contained in the system archetypes Figures 1-2
for the European ATM case.
The variable “proportion of non-customer fraud”
(r.h.s. of Figure 6 next to the label “B1: Customer is
liable”) affects “pressure to improve ATM security”.
The more fraud was committed by fraudsters, the more
the innocent customers of European banks suffered.
This resulted in an escalation in angry customer
complaints and bad publicity for European banks,
ultimately increasing the pressure to improve ATM on
European banks.
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Figure 6 Full concept system dynamics model for the European ATM case
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The feedback loops “B1: Customer is liable”, “R.
ATM fraud epidemics” and “B2: The bank awakes at
last” that were already proposed for the European
ATM archetype (Figure 2) do occur in Figure 6.
Whereas the archetype was only a qualitative model,
the full system dynamics model shown on Figure 6 is
quantitative and simulatable once all the equations are
defined. Hence, it becomes possible to trace the impact
of the feedback loops on the behavior over time of the
system.
<pressure to improve
ATM security>
<bank's delay to act
on pressure>
normal time for
vuln removal

Figure 7 shows the full system dynamics model for the
US ATM case. The core structure that was displayed
on Figure 5 is now connected by influence arrows so as
to create feedback loops that match the loops contained
in the system archetypes Figures 3-4 for the US ATM
case. Since the burden of proof is on the bank, the US
banks assumed a proactive posture regarding ATM
security, implying a high value of “pressure to improve
ATM security”.
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Figure 7 Full concept system dynamics model for the US ATM case
The feedback loops “B1: Bank is liable”, “R:
“Betting on bank accepting the loss” and “B2:
Improving to beat the crooks” that were already
proposed for the US ATM archetype (Figure 4) do
occur in Figure 7. Again, the figure 7 represents a
model that can be enhanced with equations so that it
becomes quantitative and simulatable.
The system dynamics models on Figure 6-7 were
designed with the simulation software Vensim DSS.
Vensim generates equations for the stocks expressing
that the value of the stocks accumulates the values of
the inflows and de-accumulates the values of the
outflows for each time step. The modeler has then to
add equations for the remaining variables. The
equations for the flows follow standard practice from

system dynamics (value of the stock divided by a
relevant time parameter). Relations between other
variables are expressed using table functions
expressing reasonable assumptions (such as that an
increasing fraud rate increases the pressure on the bank
to fix known, active vulnerabilities).
Some reasonable assumptions have been made as to
the total number of vulnerabilities in the ATM as well
as to the number of dormant and active vulnerabilities
at the start of the simulation. Similarly, reasonable
assumptions have been made as to the average times to
exploit vulnerabilities, to activate vulnerabilities, etc.
We proceed to discuss the results of the simulation.
Figure 8 displays the simulation for the total cumulated
fraud committed over time. The curve labeled 1
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corresponds to a typical US and curve label 2 a
European bank. As in reality, the simulation shows an
epidemic of fraud for the European case.

100 weeks) when it finally starts decreasing as a
consequence of the increasing pressure on the bank to
improve ATM security (Figure 10).

Total fraud

6. Discussion and concluding remarks
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Figure 10 Solution archetype for the US ATM case
Figure 9 displays the fraud rate in units frauds per
week. Whereas the fraud rate soon starts decreasing for
the US bank, the European bank suffers an increasing
fraud rate for a long period of time (for approximately

In this paper we illustrated with simple qualitative
system dynamics models (the system archetypes
Figures 1-4) that misaligned incentives can be doubly
misaligned: 1) because third parties, by design, suffer
from the resulting externality; and 2) since ultimately
the chosen security strategy can hit back the
organization that is most responsible (or in a privileged
position) for providing system security with a revenge.
Then quantitative system dynamics models were
presented. That is, the system dynamics models are
“quantitative” in the sense that the simulated time
series have patterns of behavior in accordance with the
empirical findings of that led to a fraud epidemic in the
case of the typical European bank and to much less
fraud for the US banks. Hence, the quantitative system
dynamics model add evidence that the feedback loops
displayed in the system archetypes indeed shape the
patterns of fraud that were observed. Here, we remind
the reader of the key tenet of system dynamics (see p.
3): the behavior over time is shaped by the feedback
loops of the system.
The models do not compute the security costs as
such. However, we may assume that the banks
ultimately had costs reflecting the amount of fraud
committed, that is, in terms for compensating clients.
In addition, we may assume that the fact that US banks
removed dormant vulnerabilities to a larger extent than
European banks will have proven less costly: dormant
vulnerabilities that get removed get never exploited
and, thus, by this very fact are cheaper than active
vulnerabilities which don’t disappear until they have
been exploited as fraud.
Obviously, it would be preferable if the case chosen
for the illustration of the arguments had been better
documented in terms of empirical time series for its
key factors. Alas, we searched and found nothing. The
same applies for other potential cases of interest related
to misaligned incentives, their impact on security and
their boomerang effects. As in many areas of
information security data is detailed data are scarce (or
not available). Still we hope that the arguments
presented in this paper elicit some curiosity as to the
power of system dynamics models to help educate the
parties in the “security battlefield”. It can be hoped that
some organizations come to the insight that it pays to
do some modeling to analyze the possible long-term
boomerang effects. The cost of developing system
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dynamics models is low and the potential gains are
high.
As a final remark we comment on the question as to
whether system dynamics could help clarify causes and
responsibilities in terms of post mortem models of
disputed cases regarding misaligned incentives in
information security. The question can be reworded as
to whether a future introduction of legal measures,
similar as those listed in “§2 Proposed measures”
should be preceded by an analysis as to factors that
should be documented and recorded so as to allow post
mortem analysis of responsibilities and liabilities.
In all countries the government ultimately acts as
the regulator of last resort and if given good inputs
could do so more effectively. In this paper we have
shown that concept system dynamics models can
provide such “inputs” and do so in a way that can be
deployed in digital form for eGovernment. In future
work we hope to elicit the interest of experts on system
dynamics modeling of project management and of
legal disputes on project failures to provide
recommendations so as to make system dynamics an
assistant and guard for legal measures in information
security.
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